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INTRODUCTION
International terrorism has come to be a fact of life. In many regions of 
the world it is a fact of everyday life, while in others it is a topic on the 
agenda. But wherever one chooses to look, the effects of terrorism will be 
there in one form or another. Just this past year we witnessed continuing 
terrorist attacks in Iraq, a suicide bomb on a bus in Jerusalem, but also the 
killing of Osama bin-Laden, whose name needs no introduction. The 
international community, as well as independent states, has employed a 
wide range of measures to suppress terrorism. Legal measures are just a part 
of those, as education, culture, the media and other spheres have no lesser 
role.  
220 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 20:2
One instrument in the international community’s toolkit against terrorism 
is international criminal law, which has led in particular to the development 
of several international and regional conventions designed to combat certain 
aspects of terrorism.1 However, the latest and greatest development in the 
field of international criminal law, the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
is still not being used for this purpose. The Rome Statute establishing the 
ICC and its governing document2 (Rome Statute) does not include terrorism 
within its jurisdiction.  
This paper examines that lack of jurisdiction and shows that the principal 
question is not whether terrorism could be included in the Rome Statute but 
what the international community and the ICC itself has to gain by doing so. 
While the existing literature generally discusses the option of including 
terrorism under the ICC, it lacks an A to Z analysis of how it could be done 
and an extensive evaluation of the consequences of such a move. Such an 
analysis is of special importance today because of the changes that occurred 
in international criminal law with respect to terrorism in the previous year—
namely, the Review Conference in the summer of 2010, where the topic of 
terrorism was not mentioned once, a path-breaking decision by the Special 
Tribunal of Lebanon concerning the definition of terrorism,3 and the killing 
of bin-Laden, which illustrated that discussion surrounding the proper 
method to deal with mega-terrorists is not all theoretical. With respect to the 
ICC, it is time to see the reality for what it is a viable option to help 
strengthen international combat against terrorism is not being used due to 
political impediments.  
The paper consists of seven parts. Following this introduction, Part 2 
provides a background to the inclusion of terrorism in the Rome Statute and 
 * CPT Aviv Cohen, Head of Foreign Relations Section, Department of 
International Law, Military Advocate General Corps, Israel Defense Force. The views in this 
article are those of the author alone and do not represent any official policy of the IDF. This 
article was written with the priceless guidance of Prof. David Stewart of Georgetown 
University Law Center. Many thanks go to Prof. David Luban, Prof. Albert Rees and Mr. 
Gilad Noam for their insightful comments. Special thanks to CPT H. John Goodell of the 
U.S. Army JAG Corps for his editing. This article is dedicated to Noam Dekel, whose 
undivided support got me through the long months of writing this piece.  
 1.   Another international law discipline to approach terrorist acts is the laws of war, 
as seen, for example, in the approach of Israel towards Palestinian terrorist organizations, and 
the approach of the United States against Al Qaeda. The issue of applying international 
criminal law along with or instead of the laws of war in the combat against terrorism is a 
complex issue worthy of its own research, which this paper will touch on only to a limited 
extent in the discussion on war crimes. See infra part 5.2.3. It is also interesting to note a 
growing trend to use civil suits, mainly tort claims against terrorists and terrorist 
organizations. For further reading on this topic, see Debra M. Strauss, Reaching out to the 
International Community: Civil Lawsuits as the Common Ground in the Battle Against 
Terrorism, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 307 (2009).
 2. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90. 
 3. See infra note 49 and accompanying text. 
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looks into the attempt at inclusion when the Rome Statute was drafted back 
in 1998. It surveys the arguments for rejecting ICC jurisdiction over 
terrorism and examines whether they are still relevant today. Concluding 
that the only viable argument left concerns the lack of agreeable definition 
of international terrorism, Part 3 delves into the issue of defining terrorism. 
It suggests that there is in fact a definition found in the Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism4 that is widely recognized and 
may suffice for the purposes of drafting the international crime of terrorism.  
Part 4 of the paper examines the procedural aspects of including a new 
crime in the Rome Statute, namely how the Statute can be amended. It 
shows that the Statute can be amended at any given time following a 
proposal by a Member State. Part 5 addresses the actual way in which 
terrorism could be included; it examines the possibility of drafting a 
standalone crime of terrorism, an “Article 8ter” to the Statute, based on the 
aforementioned procedure. It also discusses the possibility of interpreting 
the existing crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
aggression) so as to include terrorist acts even without explicitly referring to 
them as such. 
Part 6 of the paper deals with the policy considerations with regard to 
creating ICC jurisdiction over terrorist acts. It presents the advantages and 
disadvantages of such jurisdiction from the points of view of combating 
terrorism, the ICC itself, and Member and non-Member States. Finally, Part 
7 concludes the discussion. The general argument is that, as in many other 
fields of international law, where there is a political will there is a legal 
way. There are currently no legal impediments to including terrorism in the 
Rome Statute; even the definitional issue is not insurmountable. 
To illustrate this point, three case studies of terrorist attacks will 
accompany the analysis. These involve state-led terrorism versus non-state 
terrorist organizations; attacks that are directed against a distinct group of 
people because of national affiliation versus attacks that are planned to 
cause as many casualties as possible with little regard to the nationality of 
the victims. Most interestingly, the response in each of these events was 
different, from a single state operating in covert operations through an 
international sanctions mechanism, to full-scale war. In the later parts of the 
paper, the following question arises: had the ICC been an option for those 
affected states, could these acts have been dealt with under the auspices of 
the ICC?5
 4. See infra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 5. In order for a case to be considered within the jurisdiction of the ICC several 
thresholds need to be met, such as referral of a case to the ICC (according to Articles 12 and 
13 of the Rome Statute) and issues of admissibility (according to Articles 17-19 of the Rome 
Statute). The case studies discussed here may raise questions with regard to these 
requirements, for instance the proper way of referring the case of 9-11 in light of the United 
States not being a member of the Court. These difficulties notwithstanding, it is the purpose 
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The first case study is the massacre of Israeli athletes in the 1972 Munich 
Olympic Games, where eight Palestinian members of the terrorist 
organization Black September took hostages and later murdered eleven 
Israeli athletes. The terrorists’ demands were to release two hundred and 
twenty-three Palestinians prisoners held in Israel and two held in Germany. 
During the failed rescue operation, five terrorists were killed and three were 
taken into custody of German police but were released after less than two 
months.6 Israel responded with massive air strikes of terrorists’ bases in 
Syria and Lebanon, and a few years later as a consequence, Israeli Mosad 
agents allegedly hunted down and killed at least eight of the terrorists 
involved in the attack. 
The second terrorist attack to be used as an example is the Pan-Am flight 
103 bombing. On the evening of December 21, 1988, Pan-Am flight 103 
was en route from London to New York when it exploded over Lockerbie, 
Scotland. Including all the people on board the flight as well as people on 
the ground, the total number of casualties was 270 from over twenty 
different countries. Investigation of the attack discovered the involvement 
and responsibility of the Libyan government. International sanctions on 
Libya led by the United Nations followed in 1992 and 1994, as well as an 
embargo on arms and certain oil supplies. These sanctions were suspended 
in 1999 after Libya surrendered two suspects to stand trial in Scotland. In 
2003, Libya officially took responsibility for the attack and began paying 
reparations to the families of the victims. 
The third example is the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 (9/11) on 
the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington D.C. 
The largest terrorist attack in history, 9/11 took the lives of approximately 
three thousand people when nineteen terrorists belonging to the terrorist 
organization Al-Qaeda took over four commercial flights in the United 
States. The attack was furthered by anti-American sentiments among 
Muslim extremist groups opposing American involvement in the Middle 
East. Less than a month after the attack, the United States led coalition 
forces into Afghanistan where the architect of the attack, Osama Bin-Laden, 
was supposedly hiding. Almost ten years later, Bin-Laden was killed in 
Pakistan during an operation of an elite unit of the U.S. Armed Forces. With 
these three case studies in mind, we now turn to examine the relationship 
between terrorism and the ICC. 
of the current paper to focus on the nature of the acts themselves and the jurisdiction ratione 
materiae alone.
 6. Their release was facilitated by yet another terrorist attack by Black September, 
which kidnapped an airplane of the German airliner Lufthansa, and demanded their release in 
exchange of the safety of the passengers.  
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I. TERRORISM AND THE ICC 
Under the Rome Statute, the ICC does not have jurisdiction over acts of 
terrorism as a distinct offense. This situation is no accident but rather the 
express intention of the majority of states parties to the Rome Conference, 
which rejected the inclusion of terrorism in the Rome Statute.7 The 
suggested provision defined the crime of terrorism as falling into one of 
three categories:8 First, acts which constitute terrorism under a standalone 
definition that the provision provided;9 Second, an offense under six 
existing international counter terrorism conventions;10 or Third, offenses 
involving use of firearms, weapons, explosives, and dangerous substances 
when used as a means to perpetrate indiscriminate violence involving death 
or serious bodily injury to persons or groups of persons or populations or 
serious damage to property.11
This proposed provision was not approved by the states parties to the 
Rome Conference. At the conclusion of the conference, the only mention of 
 7. See, e.g., statements made by the delegates of Syria, Official Records of the 
Rome Conference, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of 
an Int’l Criminal Court, 3d plen. mtg. at 172, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/13 [hereinafter 
Official Records of the Rome Conference]; see also Morocco, id. at 173, ¶ 52; Iraq, Id. at 
174, ¶ 55; Belgium, id. at 174, ¶ 65; Greece, id. at 175, ¶ 70; Sweden, id. at 176, ¶ 89; 
Senegal, id. at 176, ¶ 90; United Kingdom, id. at 177, ¶ 117; Brazil, id. at 179, ¶ 142; 
Ethiopia, id. at 179, ¶ 148; Iran, id. at 179, ¶ 150; Netherlands, id. at 181, ¶ 20. Some of the 
state parties did not oppose the inclusion of terrorism in the statute, see the statements made 
by the delegates of Tunisia, id. at 174, ¶ 66; Republic of Korea, id. at 175, ¶ 77; Algeria, id.
at 177, ¶ 110; India, id. at 177, ¶ 120; New Zealand, id. at 178, ¶ 124; Turkey, id. at 179, ¶ 
146; Cuba, id. at 181, ¶ 22. It should also be noted that this is in contrast to the initial idea of 
establishing the ICC, which was originally proposed by Trinidad and Tobago to deal with 
offences of drug trafficking and terrorism. 
 8. U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, Rome, It., June 15-July 17, 1998, Report of the Preparatory 
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, p. 21, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.183/2 (Apr. 14, 1998) [hereinafter Report of the Preparatory Committee]. 
 9. See Report of the Preparatory Committee, supra note 8, at 21 (defining acts of 
terrorism as those “[u]ndertaking, organizing, sponsoring, ordering, facilitating, financing, 
encouraging or tolerating acts of violence against another State directed at persons or 
property and of such a nature as to create terror, fear or insecurity in the minds of public 
figures, groups of persons, the general public or populations, for whatever considerations and 
purpose of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or such other nature 
that may be invoked to justify them.”). 
 10. The conventions referred to in the provision are: Convention for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation; Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents; International 
Convention against the Taking of Hostages; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf. See Report of 
the Preparatory Committee, supra note 8, at 21.
 11. Report of the Preparatory Committee, supra note 8, at 21. 
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terrorism was in Resolution E in the Annex to the Final Act, which 
recommended revisiting the issue of including terrorism when a Review 
Conference met.12 Reading the records from the Rome Conference reveals 
six reasons underlying the rejection of the suggested terrorism provision.13
The following paragraphs will address each of these arguments and examine 
whether now, almost thirteen years after the Rome Conference, they are still 
valid. 
The first and foremost obstacle to the inclusion of terrorism in the Rome 
Statute was the lack of a clear and universally accepted definition of what 
constitutes terrorism, including dissatisfaction with the proposed definition 
in the text of the draft.14 In contrast, an argument has been put forward that 
the lack of acceptable definition should not stand in the way of employing a 
workable definition and move along with the prosecution of terrorists in the 
ICC.15 One commentator has even suggested defining terrorism in a 
“transitional format” until a universally agreed definition will be achieved.16
The issue of definition was and remains the most serious obstacle in any 
discussion of terrorism, and the current discussion is no exception. 
However, since July of 1998, there have been some developments in the 
road towards finding a universally accepted definition of terrorism. Due to 
the centrality of the issue, it deserves a thorough review, and it will be 
explored at length in the following part of the paper. 
The second reason for states’ reluctance to include terrorism in the Rome 
Statute was the notion that the three core crimes—war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and genocide—represented the crimes of greatest concern 
to the international community, and terrorism does not rise to this level of 
international concern.17 However, examining the way in which the 
 12. Official Records of the Rome Conference, supra note 7, at vol. 1. 
 13. See also Eric Bales, Torturing the Rome Statute: The Attempt to Bring 
Guantanamo’s Detainees within the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 16 
TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 173, 188 (2009); Lucy Martinez, Prosecuting Terrorists at the 
International Criminal Court: Possibilities and Problems, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 18 (2002);
Christian Much, The International Criminal Court (ICC) and Terrorism as an International 
Crime, 14 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 121, 126 (2006); Pouyan Afshar Mazandaran, An 
International Legal Response to an International Problem: Prosecuting International 
Terrorists, 6 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 503, 528 (2006); ROBERTA ARNOLD, THE ICC AS A NEW 
INSTRUMENT FOR REPRESSING TERRORISM 56 (2004). 
 14. See Official Records of the Rome Conference, supra note 7, at 172 , 173, 180 for 
statements made by the delegates of Syria, Pakistan, and Oman respectively. See also Bales, 
supra note 13, at 185; Richard J. Goldstone & Janine Simpson, Evaluating the Role of the 
International Criminal Court as a Legal Response to Terrorism, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 13, 
14 (2003).
 15. Michael Lawless, Terrorism: An International Crime, 63 INT’L J. 139, 159
(2007-2008). 
 16. Mark D. Kielsgard, A Human Rights Approach to Counter-Terrorism, 36 CAL.
W. INT’L L.J. 249, 286 (2006). 
 17. See Official Records of the Rome Conference, supra note 7, at 72 (statements 
made by the delegate of Slovakia); Much, supra note 13, at 124. 
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international community as a whole and states individually have addressed 
terrorism can lead to the conclusion that nowadays terrorists are as hostis 
humani generic as war criminals or perpetrators of genocide or crimes 
against humanity.18 For instance, comparing the status19 of the Genocide 
Convention20 to that of the Terrorism Financing Convention21 shows that 
while the former has forty-one signatories and 141 parties; the latter has 132 
signatories and 173 parties. In addition, the Security Council has affirmed 
that acts of international terrorism constitute threats to international peace 
and security.22
Even on a more basic level, the notion of an international crime 
originated with piracy. Piracy hampered transnational trade and was in the 
common interest of every country to criminalize. Since piracy occurred on 
the high seas, no one state could assert the responsibility to combat piracy, 
and an international cooperation was necessary. Thus, it developed through 
state practice to be an international crime.23 While terrorist acts occur within 
territorial boundaries, there can be an analogy between piracy and terrorism: 
terrorist acts were initially considered as “mere” treaty crimes, but as they 
became more international in nature and carried more disastrous results, 
they generated a need for an international cooperation to combat them and 
were the subject of growing international condemnation. Thus, this 
development has led some commentators to argue that terrorist acts have 
advanced to be regarded as international crimes.24 Is terrorism less heinous 
than piracy? The most likely answer would probably be no. Does it disturb 
the conscience of the international community just like genocide or crimes 
against humanity? Ten years ago before 9/11 and the global war on terror 
the answer would have been most likely not. Today it is not that simple. For 
example, the attacks of 9/11 in the United States and following attacks in 
various cities in Europe, North Africa, and South Asia probably troubled 
more people than the atrocities and genocide committed in Darfur during 
the same years. 
The third ground for rejecting the inclusion of terrorism in the Rome 
Statute was the desire to avoid overburdening the ICC and the need for a 
 18. Martinez, supra note 13, at 40-41; Mazandaran, supra note 13, at 527. 
 19. See UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=IV-
1&chapter=4&lang=en#Participants (showing the current status of the Genocide 
Convention). 
 20. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
 21. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 
9, 1999, 39 I.L.M. 270  [hereinafter Financing Convention]. 
 22. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
 23. Lawless, supra note 15, at 140. 
 24. Much, supra note 13, at 125. 
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gravity threshold.25 The counter argument to this claim is that the fear from 
a work overload of the court is not unique to terrorism and has already been 
addressed in the Rome Statute itself. The drafters of the Rome Statute knew 
that the ICC should be reserved for a special class of the most atrocious 
acts, and they have put some safety valves in the text to accomplish that. 
These built-in mechanisms will ensure that the ICC will have jurisdiction 
over the most severe terrorist acts just like it has jurisdiction over the most 
severe crimes against humanity or any of the other crimes.26
Article 1 of the Rome Statute set forth clearly that the ICC will exercise 
jurisdiction only for the “most serious crimes of international concern.”27
Article 5, which specifies crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, 
reiterates this language.28 In addition, the principle of complementarity, 
according to which the ICC will defer to national jurisdictions, was 
designed to prevent an overload of cases in the international court system 
while the national courts have more direct access to evidence and 
manpower.29 Thus, the fears about overburdening the Court with a flood of 
terrorist cases do not seem realistic in light of the safeguards already 
directing the Court’s work.30
The fourth argument against the initial inclusion of terrorism in the 
Rome Statute was that such an inclusion would impede the acceptance of 
the Rome Statute.31 This concern is irrelevant today because the Rome 
Statute did, in fact, come into force and currently has 114 member states. 
However, similar concerns may rise with respect to the acceptance of a new 
crime of terrorism. As will be elaborated ahead,32 any amendment to the 
Rome Statute does not apply automatically to all the states parties but rather 
applies only to those states parties that have ratified it specifically.  
A fifth argument is based on a more practical level; some states 
questioned the need to include terrorism in the Rome Statute because, as a 
 25. See Official Records of the Rome Conference, supra note7, at 176 ¶ 96 for 
statement made by the delegate of Ukraine; id. at 176 ¶ 99 for statement made by the 
delegate of the United States. See also Much, supra note 13, at 129.
 26. ARNOLD, supra note 13, at 195. 
 27. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 1. 
 28. Id. art. 5. 
 29. The other rationale for the principle of complementarity was maintaining state 
sovereignty. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 351 (2003); Mark S. 
Ellis, The International Criminal Court and its Implications for Domestic Law and National 
Capacity Building, 15 FLA. J. INT’L L. 215, 222 (2002); Michael A. Newton, The 
Complementarity Conundrum: Are We Watching Evolution or Evisceration?, 8 SANTA 
CLARA J. INT’L L. 115, 134 (2010); ROBERT CRYER, HAKAN FRIMAN, DARRYL ROBINSON &
ELIZABETH WILMSHURST, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND 
PROCEDURE 127 (2007). 
 30. Tim Stephens, International Criminal Law and the Response to International 
Terrorism, 27 U. NEW S. WALES L. J. 454, 480 (2004); Martinez, supra note 13, at 52.
 31. See Official Records of the Rome Conference, supra note 7, at 178 for statement 
by the delegate of Italy. 
 32. See infra Part 4.
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treaty crime, there was already in place a system of international 
cooperation to deal with it.33 While it may be true that the counter-terrorism 
conventions attempt to create a regime of “extradite or prosecute” between 
their member states and ensure the cooperation between them, this is not a 
good enough reason to deny ICC jurisdiction. For instance, genocide, an 
undisputed core crime, was also under the regime of an international treaty 
already in place in 1948.34 In addition, most of the war crimes under the 
Rome Statute were already dealt with in the Geneva Conventions.35
This argument asserts that terrorism has a solid basis as a treaty crime to 
be dealt with on the international level. This is the exact opposite of the 
argument made earlier, namely, that terrorism is not a well-established 
crime compared to the other core crimes. The fact of the matter is that the 
existing legal instruments to deal with what the international community 
perceives as a criminal conduct are simply irrelevant when determining 
whether a crime should be included in the Rome Statute. The purpose of 
including an international crime in the Rome Statute is to generate ICC 
jurisdiction over it, not to fill a vacuum in international law where there is 
no existing regime to suppress a certain crime. And even if it did, it is not at 
all clear that the current counter-terrorism regime created by these 
conventions is successful enough to justify not creating ICC jurisdiction 
over terrorism as an additional tool.36
As discussed in the following sections, if the definition of the crime of 
terrorism will include a reference to counter-terrorism treaties, then a whole 
array of questions arises regarding the relationship between the Rome 
Statute and these treaties, especially in cases where a country is a party to 
the Rome Statute but not to a specific treaty. This conundrum 
notwithstanding, the mere fact that legal instruments exist to suppress 
certain manifestations of terrorist acts does not preclude in any way the ICC 
from exercising jurisdiction over terrorism as well. 
The sixth and final objection to the inclusion of the terrorism in the 
Rome Statute argued that since terrorism is such a politically-sensitive term, 
 33. See Official Records of the Rome Conference, supra note 7, at 174 ¶ 59 for 
statements made by the delegates of Japan; see id. at 176, for statements by the delegate of 
Sweden. 
 34. Genocide Convention, supra note 20. 
 35. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva 
Convention for the Armed Forces]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention for the Armed Forces at Sea]; 
Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention for Prisoners of War]; Geneva Convention 
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 
287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention for Persons in Time of War]. 
 36. For more elaboration on the deficiencies of the existing counter-terrorism treaties 
see ARNOLD, supra note 13, at 49. 
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if the ICC would deal with cases of terrorism, it will be forced into the 
political realm and thus will hurt its legitimacy and credibility as an 
impartial judicial institution.37 The first part of this argument is true. 
Terrorist acts stir political debates about why a certain act is an act of 
terrorism and not merely a legitimate act of protest. 
Having said that, the fear of politicization is not unique to terrorism. In 
the summer of 2010, the Member States activated the ICC’s jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression, a matter that was also not resolved in the 
Rome Conference. In the modern reality where non-state actors are 
operating from the sovereign territory of certain failed states; where most of 
the armed conflicts are of non-international character; and ‘a low-intensity 
armed conflict short of war’ is the title given to one of the most prolonged 
conflicts in the middle east, there is no doubt that cases involving the crime 
of aggression will touch the very heart and soul of international politics—
the infringement on a state’s sovereignty.38
Moreover, even with other crimes, the ICC is not sheltered from 
concerns of politicization. For example, the official reason why Israel did 
not join the ICC, despite its active role in advocating its importance, is the 
inclusion of transfer of population as a war crime in a language that would 
render Israeli settlements in the occupied territories a war crime.39 This is a 
highly political issue and one of the recurring themes in the Israeli-
Palestinian dispute. More recently, the case of the arrest warrant issued in 
March 2009 against the President of Sudan, Al-Bashir, on account of his 
involvement in acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes 
committed in Sudan40 also illustrate this point. Is an arrest warrant against 
an acting head of state any less political than possible charges against a 
terrorist? In sum, all international crimes involve political sensitivities to 
some extent, and this argument could have been raised with respect to any 
of the crimes within the jurisdiction of the court.  
 37. See Official Records of the Rome Conference, supra note 7, at 278 for statement 
by the delegate of Ghana. Such statements are still made today. See e.g., Luz E. Nagle, 
Terrorism and Universal Jurisdiction: Opening a Pandora’s Box?, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
339, 361 (2011).
 38. See Keith A. Petty, Sixty Years In The Making: The Definition of Aggression for 
the International Criminal Court, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 531, 532 (2008) 
(discussing the political nature of aggression as an impediment to finding a legal definition of 
aggression). See also Marek Meleško, The Definition of the Crime of Aggression in the 
Context of the Rome Statute, 4 ACTA SOCIETATIS MARTENSIS 139, 156-158 (2009-2010) 
(discussing whether the crime of aggression can be prosecuted effectively, among other 
reasons, due to the political considerations the Prosecutor would have to take into account).
 39. Allen Baker, The International Criminal Court, 16 IDF L. REV.  879, 891 (2003). 
 40. Press Release, International Criminal Court, ICC Prosecutor Presents Case 
Against Sudanese President, Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, for Genocide, Crimes Against 
Humanity and War Crimes in Darfur (July 14, 2008) ICC-OTP-20080714-PR341-ENG, 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/ 
situation%20icc%200205/press%20releases/a?lan=en-GB. 
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The conclusion from the above discussion is that out of the six 
arguments presented in the Rome Conference in 1998 against the inclusion 
of terrorism within the jurisdiction of the ICC, today, five seem not credible. 
With the perspective of almost a decade of work of the court and in light of 
recent developments, such as the adoption of the crime of aggression, the 
stakes have changed. Only one issue may still prove to be a real obstacle. 
That issue is the lack of an acceptable definition of terrorism. Because of 
the centrality of this matter, it will be dealt with at length in the following 
portions of this paper. 
Before turning to the complex and controversial issue of defining 
terrorism, it is worth noting the results of the Rome Conference with respect 
to terrorism, namely that it will “be considered at a later stage”.41 About a 
year ago, in the summer of 2010, that “later stage” finally arrived, and the 
States Parties were convened in the Review Conference held in Kampala, 
Uganda. The agenda for the Review Conference, however, did not include 
terrorism42, and the official records of the conference do not mention the 
words “terrorism” or “terror” even once.43 Despite this failure, a proposal to 
include terrorism in the Rome Statute does not have to wait another seven 
years, a fact that enhances the relevance of this discussion. The crime of 
terrorism suggested here can be endorsed by a state party and amended into 
the Rome Statute as early as the next Assembly of State Parties convene, as 
elaborated ahead.44
II. DEFINING THE CRIME OF TERRORISM
In the past, the word terrorism was referred to as a descriptive term, an 
adjective found along acts that were criminalized, such as bombing, 
hijacking aircrafts, taking hostages, etc. With time, the word began to take a 
legal life of its own. “Terrorism” is now the subject of criminalization and, 
thus, requires a legal definition of what constitutes terrorism.45 The number 
of definitions given to terrorism might directly correspond to the number of 
people asked. This diversity notwithstanding, most of the definitions of 
terrorism address the same core elements.46 These are first, the use or threat 
 41. See Official Records of the Rome Conference, supra note 7, at vol. 1. 
 42. International Criminal Court, Provisional Agenda, Doc. RC/1, May 11 2010. 
 43. Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
Kampala, Uganda, May 31-June 11, 2010, Official Records, Doc. RC/11 [hereinafter Review 
Conference]. 
 44. See discussion on the procedural aspects of amending the Rome Statute, infra,
Part 4. 
 45. James D. Fry, The Swindle of Fragmented Criminalization: Continuing 
Piecemeal Responses to International Terrorism and Al Qaeda, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 377, 
393-94 (2009). 
 46. Bales, supra note 13, at 180; Martinez, supra note 13, at 10; Jackson Nyamuya 
Maotogo, Countering Terrorism: From Wigged Judges to Helmeted Soldiers—Legal 
Perspectives in America’s Counter-Terrorism Responses, 6 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 243 
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of use of violence; second, the act is indiscriminate in that the immediate 
victims are chosen randomly and are not the ultimate audience of the act;47
third, the violence is intentionally targeted towards civilians as opposed to 
combatant forces; and finally, the purpose of the act is to compel a 
government or an organization to perform or abstain from performing a 
certain action.48 The distinction between domestic and international 
terrorism depends on the existence of a transnational element in the act.49
A support for this argument is found in a recent seminal decision by the 
Appeal Chamber of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), which 
identified a definition of international terrorism under customary 
international law.50 After examining state practice in suppressing terrorism 
through international cooperation, domestic legislation, and judgments, the 
STL Appeal Chamber concluded that there exists a crime of terrorism under 
customary international law, which is composed of the three 
aforementioned elements.51
The remainder of this part will examine the current state of affairs with 
respect to finding a universally acceptable definition of terrorism. It will 
explore the principal impediments and how they could be dealt with in the 
context of ICC jurisdiction. The main argument presented here is that, as the 
STL Appeal Chamber rightly held, a de facto internationally acceptable 
(2005); Lawless, supra note 15, at 150; ARNOLD, supra note 13, at 4; Reuven Young, 
Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept in International Law 
and Its Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation, 29 B. C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 23, 
25 (2006); Vincent-Joel Proulx, Rethinking the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court in the Post-September 11th Era: Should Acts of terrorism Qualify as Crimes Against 
Humanity?, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1009, 1034 (2004). 
 47. While the victims are usually affiliated with a larger targeted group, the 
individual identities of most terrorist victims are not a determined factor. This is as opposed 
to the criminal offence of homicide, where the identity of the victims is a vital factor in the 
circumstances of the offence.
 48. How strong the link is between a specific act and the greater purpose could vary. 
For instance, the November 2008 Mumbai attack was not directed against the Indian 
government, but rather was part of a larger campaign against Israel; as opposed to the 
terrorist attack in March 2011 in Itamar (an Israeli settlement where a Palestinian massacred 
a family, including a three month old infant), was directed against the Israeli settlements.  
It is also worth noting that one controversial issue is whether terrorist acts include damage to 
property as the main act, in contrast to damage to property as a side effect of an act designed 
to hurt people. Contrary to the common view in the literature, the Special Court of Sierra 
Leone held that terrorism does encompass damage to property, and noted that “the 
destruction of people’s home or means of livelihood and, in turn, their means of survival, 
will operate to install fear and terror.” See Prosecutor v. Brima, Case no. SCSL-04-16-T, 
Judgment of Trial Chamber II, ¶ 670 (June 20, 2007), available at http://www.sc-
sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=vjmJCKSU01E%3d&tabid=173. 
 49. This could be, for example, that the perpetrator is not a national of the country 
where the act took place, that the victims were of multiple nationalities, etc. See Interlocutory 
Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, 
Cumulative Charging, Case No. STL-11-01/I, ¶ 89, Feb. 16, 2011. 
 50. Id. ¶ 83. 
 51. Id. ¶ 85-86.
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definition of terrorism already exists and is found in the Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.52 This definition will be adopted 
for the purpose of this study. 
A. Defining Terrorism: Where We Are and Why 
The current state of affairs with respect to defining terrorism has not 
changed a great deal in the last decade. Most individual states have their 
own domestic definitions in national legislation;53 the United Nations 
Security Council has adopted resolutions some of which describe terrorism 
but do not provide a clear definition of it; and a handful of regional 
conventions and international conventions exhibit definitions that exist with 
a certain scenario in mind. Although at first sight these various instruments 
might seem inherently different, the STL Appeal Chamber revealed that 
they are actually very much alike, and leaving out the transnational element, 
domestic definitions are almost identical to those found in international 
instruments.54
In 1996, following an initiative by India,55 a Draft International 
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (Draft Comprehensive 
Convention) was the new hope to agree on a definition and unite the 
international counter terrorism measures under one single instrument. The 
current version of the Draft Comprehensive Convention is still being 
debated at the Ad Hoc Committee dealing with this matter in the United 
Nations, which is responsible to correspond with the different countries and 
address their concerns with the hopes of concluding an agreeable text to 
pass on to the Sixth (Legal) Committee.  
There are two main obstacles that have been holding back any progress 
on the Draft Comprehensive Convention for almost ten years now.56 These 
 52. Id. ¶ 88. 
 53. A useful source of state legislation in the field of counter terrorism can be found 
in the U.N. Counter Terrorism Committee web-site, which contains reports submitted by 
U.N. member states to the Committee in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1373. 
In these reports, states specify their legal means to combat terrorism and specifically to 
implement the Resolution. Examples of different definitions of terrorism in state legislation 
can be found in Argentina’s Act No. 25,241 on Repentant Offenders (U.N. Doc. 
S/2001/1340); Australia’s Crimes (Foreign Incursions and Recruitment) Act of 1978, (using 
the term “engage in a hostile activity in a foreign state”) (U.N. Doc. S/2001/1247); Egypt’s 
Law No. 97, as well as Article 86(a) of the Penal Law (U.N. Doc. S/2001/1237); India’s 
Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance Section 3(1) (U.N. Doc. S/2001/1278); and South 
Africa’s Internal Security Act of 1982, Section 54(1) (U.N. Doc. s/2001/1281). 
 54. STL Appeal Chamber decision, supra note 49, ¶ 91.
 55. Letter dated Nov. 1, 1996 from the permanent representative of India to the 
United Nations to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/51/6 (Nov. 11, 1996). 
 56. Compare the report by the Ad Hoc Committee from 2010 with the Article 
published in 2003. Rep. of the Ad Hoc Comm., 14th Sess., Apr. 12-16, 2010, U.N. Doc. 
A/65/37; Christopher C. Joyner, International Extradition and Global Terrorism: Bringing 
International Criminals to Justice, 25 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 493, 533 (2003).
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are the matter of state’s use of force against its own civilians and the 
controversy over creating an exception to the definition in the case of 
opposition to foreign occupation.57 With respect to the former, state’s 
terrorism is a complex issue which in itself generated voluminous writing. It 
raises questions regarding the legality of the use of force,58 and a thorough 
examination of it exceeds the scope of the current study. In any event, the 
ICC has jurisdiction only over natural persons, and thus any claims against 
states in the context of terrorism cannot be brought before the ICC. They 
could arguably fall under the jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice.59 A natural person following governmental orders or acting in their 
official capacity when carrying out a terrorist attack could be tried before 
the ICC without the need to determine whether the State itself committed 
acts of terrorism. This is similar to prosecuting war crimes, for instance, but 
contrary to the crime of aggression.60
The second area of dispute is more complex, as it touches the politically-
sensitive right of self-determination and the recourse to force used by 
groups who assert such a right and countries that support them. Professor 
Ben Saul, for example, vigorously condemns the criminalization of such 
groups as terrorists, and asserts that “legitimate liberation movements” 
should be accorded the status of lawful combatants.61 However, Saul’s 
argument lacks the clear notion that even if the said groups are treated as, in 
his words, “lawful combatants,” it is still illegal under international law for 
them to target civilians. His argument seems to work against the goal he is 
attempting to advocate since parties to an armed conflict bear more 
responsibilities under international law than parties to violence that does not 
amount to an armed conflict.62 Thus, if accepted, Saul’s argument would 
still enable prosecuting terrorists, in some circumstances, as war criminals.  
Even without treating terrorist groups as “lawful combatants,” and as 
legitimate as claims for self-determination may be, they still do not justify 
the use of violence against civilians. The use of aggressive force was 
 57. Stephens, supra note 30, at 458; Much, supra note 13, at 130; Bruce Broomhall, 
Terrorism at Trial: State Actors in an International Definition of Terrorism from a Human 
Rights Perspective, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 421, 434 (2005); Goldstone & Simpson, 
supra note 14, at 13.
 58. Kielsgard, supra note 16, at 272. 
 59. Goldstone & Simpson, supra note 14, at 19. 
 60. For discussion on the requirement to determine that a state committed an act of 
aggression before charging a person with the crime of aggression, see infra Part 5.2.4. 
 61. Ben Saul, Defending ‘Terrorism’: Justifications and Excuses for Terrorism in 
International Criminal Law, 25 AUST. Y. B. I. L. 177, 186 (2006). 
 62. Violence that amounts to “armed conflict,” whether international or non-
international in nature, is governed by the laws and customs of war, whereas violence that 
does not amount to an “armed conflict” is usually considered within the scope of the 
exceptions to these laws, and as governed by the principle of non-intervention in a state’s 
internal affairs.  
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explicitly prohibited in the UN Charter,63 and since it applies to all existing 
states, the proper policy point of view is that it should apply similarly to 
those groups who perceive themselves as independent states. If the 
international community is serious about its desire to suppress terrorism, 
then there can be no exceptions. Intentional targeting of innocent civilians 
should be deemed illegal in times of peace as it is in times of war regardless 
of the political aspirations of the entity responsible for such acts.64
Debates on the Comprehensive Convention and the role of resistance 
movements in the definition of terrorism will probably not come to an end 
in the near future. Perhaps the events in Egypt in February 2011 will 
demonstrate to extremist groups how a political revolution can be carried 
out in a non-violent manner by showing the strength of the population rather 
than its willingness to kill innocent civilians of the opponent side.65 These 
debates notwithstanding, a crime of terrorism must still be defined in order 
to apply ICC jurisdiction over it. For the purposes of this study the 
definition in the Financing Convention66 was chosen.  
B. The Definition in the Financing Convention 
The Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism was 
signed in 1999, and in many respects, it provides the first general definition 
of terrorism since the failed attempt to do so in the League of Nations 
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism in 1937.67
Article 2 of the Financing Convention sets forth the prohibition on the 
various forms of financing terrorism. By defining which conduct the finance 
of which is prohibited, the Convention provides a legal definition of 
terrorism. The definition is twofold. Article 2(1)(a) refers to acts previously 
prohibited in prior international counter-terrorism conventions, and Article 
2(1)(b) refers to “any other act” of terrorism or, in the language of the 
provision: 
(b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a 
civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in 
a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or 
 63. UN Charter art. 2, para. 4.
 64. ROBERT J. CURRIE, INTERNATIONAL & TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 299 
(2010). 
 65. Compare the demonstrations and cries for democracy and political within 
Egyptian political system to the demonstrations that took place in front of the Israeli 
consulate in Alexandria, Egypt, where calls were for a third Intifada and another war with 
Israel. See Roee Nahmias, Hundreds Rally Outside Israeli Consulate in Alexandria,
YNETNEWS.COM (Israel)(Apr. 15, 2011), 
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4057217,00.html. 
 66. Financing Convention, supra note 21. 
 67. Young, supra note 46, at 53. 
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context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an 
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act. 
This definition addresses the actus reus of a terrorist act, namely the 
infliction of physical harm.68 The targets are civilians or persons not taking 
direct part in hostilities. It also addresses the special mens rea which 
signifies terrorist acts from “mere” criminal conduct—the purpose is to 
bring about a political change or to intimidate a population. Article 2(1)(b) 
does not, however, deal with the identity of the perpetrator, and thus may 
potentially apply to both state and non-state entities and individuals. This 
definition is acceptable to the majority of states, and it provides a sound 
basis for a crime of terrorism to be introduced to the Rome Statute.  
Furthermore, the general language used in this definition with respect to 
the terrorist act itself, namely not limiting it to certain behavior using 
specific means, makes this definition suitable in the long run as it will be 
able to address issues like cyber-terrorism and future manifestations of 
terrorism.69 It is also worth noting that this definition does not exclude 
“freedom fighters” from its scope. Other than Syria, no contracting party 
made any reservation or declaration regarding resistance to foreign 
occupation and its exclusion from the definition of terrorism.70
The wide acceptance of the Financing Convention and the abstract 
manner in which it describes terrorism have risen it to a level where most 
commentators in the field regard it as the most advanced definition of 
terrorism yet.71 Professor Reuven Young argued “the evident willingness of 
states to rapidly assume binding treaty obligations [with regard to the 
counter-terrorism conventions] illustrates how the momentum and extent of 
state behavior can establish the dual element of [international] custom.”72
When he wrote those lines in 2006, he observed that while the counter-
 68. It is worth noting that in some states in Europe terrorists are criminalized without 
a requirement of actus reus being met. This means that terrorist suspects are criminalized at a 
preliminary stage, before any terrorist attack has occurred. In the Netherlands, for instance, 
terrorists could be criminalized subjectively based on their terrorist purpose alone. For 
further elaboration on European legislation and the criticism against such legislation see 
Elies Van Sliedregt, European Approaches to Fighting Terrorism, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L
L. 413, 424-26 (2010) (arguing it does not comply with the presumption of innocence). 
 69. For a review of the applicability of certain counter-terrorism conventions to cases 
of cyber-terrorism and a specific analysis of the Financing Convention in that respect, see 
Aviv Cohen, Cyberterrorism: Are We Legally Ready? 9 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 1 (2010). 
 70. See the status of ratifications and reservations on the UNODC website. 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/54/109 (Dec. 9, 1999), available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/
Special/1999%20International%20Convention%20for%20the%20Suppression%20of%20the
%20Financing%20of%20Terrorism.pdf. 
 71. Bales, supra note 13, at 176; Stephens, supra note 30, at 461; Martinez, supra
note 13, at 6.
 72. Young, supra note 46, at 65. 
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terrorism conventions were “norm creating,” they were still far from the 
threshold of creating a customary prohibition.73
This observation is still valid today. While the Financing Convention 
enjoys a large number of state parties to meet the ‘state practice’ 
requirement of customary international law, the second element, ‘opinio 
juris,’ is harder to satisfy. As Professor Naomi Norberg pointed out, the 
definition in the Financing Convention cannot be said to represent 
consensus since the overwhelming majority of state parties joined the 
convention only after the terrorist attack of 9/11 because United Nation 
Security Council Resolution 1373 required them to do so.74 Thus, the 
motives behind the signing of the convention could be attributed to the legal 
obligation on states to comply with Security Council resolutions adopted 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, rather than to a sense of obligation to 
suppress the financing of terrorism as defined in this convention.  
This is a compelling argument, although the magnitude of the events of 
9/11 makes it difficult to determine whether and to what degree they had an 
effect on the great number of states who subsequently joined the 
convention. It is possible to argue that 9/11 was a turning point in how most 
countries in the world treated terrorism, and a thorough survey of state 
behavior before and after 9/11 may support this claim. It is worth noting 
that the STL Appeal Chamber found that opinio juris does exist through 
examining legislation and decisions of domestic courts from countries all 
over the world.75 In any event, whether the definition does or does not rise 
to the normative level of customary international law does not diminish 
from the value of its wide acceptance.  
With respect to the Draft Comprehensive Convention, the greatest 
advantage of the Financing Convention over it is implied in the difference 
between their names. The Financing Convention has already been in force 
for more than a decade; it is a finished product. It is also worth noting that 
the definition of terrorist act in the Draft Comprehensive Convention is built 
upon the definition in the Financing Convention. Thus, as long as the Draft 
Comprehensive Convention remains a “draft” and the support for the 
Financing Convention remains almost universal, the reminder of the 
analysis will use the definition of terrorist acts as referred to in the 
 73. Id.
 74. Naomi Norberg, Terrorism and International Criminal Justice: Dim Prospects 
for a Future Together, 8 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 11, 25 (2010). 
 75. This determination was made with respect to what the STL defined as the 
international crime of terrorism under customary international law, which, as was discussed 
earlier, corresponds to the elements in the definition of the Financing Convention. See STL 
Appeal Chamber decision, supra note 49, ¶ 100. The Appeal Chamber continued explaining 
that the practice of states to prevent and punish acts of terrorism is “evidence of a belief of 
States that the punishment of terrorism responds to a social necessity (opinio necessitateis) 
and is hence rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule requiring it (opinio juris).” Id. ¶ 
102. 
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Financing Convention to form the basis of the future definition of the 
international crime of terrorism. 
A word of caution is in order here. In the legal discourse the same word 
can have different meanings in different contexts. Thus, for example, the 
words “crimes against humanity” mean different things in the context of the 
ICTY, the ICTR, and the ICC.76 Thus, finding a meaning to the word 
“terrorism” is only the first step. Importing that meaning from an external 
legal context, such as the Financing Convention, requires examination of 
whether that meaning will be acceptable in a different context. In other 
words, while states widely accepted the aforementioned definition for the 
purpose of the Financing Convention, they may have other interests to take 
into account that preclude adopting the same definition for ICC purposes. 
This paper suggests that, in light of the above discussion on the features of 
the definition in the Financing Convention, this definition is not only the 
suitable definition for terrorism per se, but it is also the appropriate 
definition for the crime of terrorism under the scope of ICC jurisdiction.  
III. INCLUDING TERRORISM IN THE ROME STATUTE: PROCEDURAL ASPECTS
The Rome Statute includes instructions on how to amend it. These 
instructions are divided into amendments regarding the bodies of the ICC77
and amendments regarding the scope and substance of the Court’s 
jurisdiction.78 Paragraph 1 of Article 121 sets forth that the first 
amendments were to be suggested seven years after the entry into force of 
 76. Compare Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia art. 5, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (defining “crimes 
against humanity” to be any of the following crimes committed in armed conflict and 
directed against any civilian population: murder; extermination; enslavement; deportation; 
imprisonment; torture; rape; persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds; or other 
inhumane acts) with Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 3, S.C. 
Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (defining “crimes against humanity” to be 
any of the following when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against 
any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds: murder; 
extermination; enslavement; deportation; imprisonment; torture; rape; persecutions on 
political, racial and religious grounds; or other inhumane acts), and the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, supra note 2, art. 7 (defining “crimes against humanity” to be 
any of the following crimes when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: murder; 
extermination; enslavement; deportation or forcible transfer of population; imprisonment or 
other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international 
law; torture; rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparative gravity; persecution against 
any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, 
gender; enforced disappearance of persons; apartheid; or other inhumane acts of a similar 
character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or 
physical health). 
 77. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 122.
 78. Id. art. 121. 
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the Rome Statute, which was the legal basis for the amendments made in 
the Review Conference last summer.79 Once the seven years period has 
passed, Article 121 does not set any additional time limits for proposing 
amendments. Thus, any State Party may propose an amendment to include 
terrorism as a crime under Article 5 of the Statute at any given time.80
Of course, this kind of a proposal does not pop up out of the blue. Prior 
to submitting an official proposal there will need to be some behind the 
scenes diplomatic efforts to get the support of State Parties for such a move. 
Once an official proposal is made, the Assembly of States Parties, the 
legislative body of the ICC, decides whether to take up the proposal or not.81
The Assembly meets on an annual basis with the next meeting at the time of 
writing, its tenth session, scheduled to take place in December, 2011. In 
addition, Article 121 allows the States Parties to convene a special review 
conference in addition to its annual meetings, so in theory, a suggestion to 
include terrorism in the Rome Statute could be discussed as soon as the 
Assembly next convenes.  
An amendment may be adopted by a consensus or a two-thirds majority 
of States Parties.82 If changes are made in the list of offenses or in their 
definitions, the ICC will exercise jurisdiction only with respect to States 
Parties that have accepted these amendments.83 In cases where the 
amendment was welcomed by an overwhelming majority of seven-eighths 
States Parties, just short of unanimous, approximately 100 out of the current 
114 States Parties, then the opposing state may immediately withdraw from 
the entire Statute.84
The procedure with respect to including terrorism as a crime in the Rome 
Statute is quite simple. It will take two thirds of the States Parties to approve 
such an amendment to the Rome Statute in order for it to be adopted, and it 
can happen as soon as a single State Party puts a suggestion of this sort on 
the table. There are currently no procedural obstacles preventing terrorism 
from being included in the Rome Statute as a matter of principle. However, 
the politics and diplomacy efforts undertaken to get the support for such a 
proposal may prove to overshadow any notions of optimism and enhance 
the conclusion that amending the Rome Statute is as much a political move 
as it is a legal one.  
 79. Review Conference, supra note 43. 
 80. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT 190 (2004). 
 81. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 121(2). 
 82. Id. art. 121(3).
 83. Id. art. 121(5). 
 84. Id. art. 121(6). 
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IV. INCLUDING TERRORISM IN THE ROME STATUTE: SUBSTANTIVE LAW 
ASPECTS
While the procedure for amending the Rome Statute is, at least on its 
face, clear and straightforward, the substance of such an amendment is 
anything but those superlatives. Generally speaking, there are two ways in 
which the ICC can exercise jurisdiction over terrorism as an international 
crime.85 The first is through introducing an independent crime of terrorism 
as a fifth crime under Article 5. This is a rocky road, which involves 
defining the crime and whether or not it should include a reference to 
existing international counter-terrorism conventions. The second way to 
include terrorism within ICC jurisdiction is through interpreting the 
language of existing crimes as lending itself to terrorism. While this may 
seem much more appealing in that it does not require changes to the Rome 
Statute, it nonetheless raises serious questions of treaty interpretation, as 
well as questions of policy. Specifically, this concerns the purpose that 
underlies the inclusion of terrorism in the Rome Statute—is it to accomplish 
prosecution of terrorists with less importance attributed to the actual 
charges; or is it to prosecute terrorists because they are terrorists? This latter 
path is more problematic. The following part will explore both these 
avenues. 
A. An Independent Crime 
One alternative to encompass terrorist acts within the jurisdiction of the 
ICC is the direct and explicit way of introducing a new crime into the Rome 
Statute according to the amendment procedure. The new crime could be 
structured similarly to the suggestion made at the Rome Conference by 
introducing a general definition of the offense as well as reference to the 
offenses under existing international counter-terrorism conventions. As 
noted above, this is the approach in the Financing Convention, and thus, the 
new crime would be consistent with the existing counter-terror regime. 
A standalone crime of terrorism sounds more dramatic than it really is, 
assuming it follows the definition in the Financing Convention. Out of the 
114 States Parties to the ICC, 108 are either parties, signatories, or both to 
the Financing Convention, with the six exceptions being Chad, Gambia, 
Saint Lucia, Suriname, Timor Leste, and Zambia. Thus, 94.7% percent of 
ICC State Parties have already acknowledged that terrorist acts are those 
falling within this definition. The only innovation of this crime within the 
Rome Statute will be to introduce ICC jurisdiction over it. Regardless, a 
State Party may refuse to accept the application of the new amendment. For 
states like India, which is currently not a State Party to the ICC but is to the 
Financing Convention and was one of the more adamant participants in the 
 85. Stephens, supra note 30, at 479.
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Rome Conference favoring the inclusion of terrorism within the jurisdiction 
of the ICC, this may provide an incentive to consider joining the ICC. 
The same analysis can be made with respect to any of the international 
counter-terrorism conventions referred to with respect to the crime of 
terrorism. Contrary to concerns raised by at least one commentator,86 there 
is no need for a perfect correlation between the States Parties to the ICC and 
the States Parties to each and every one of these conventions. This is true as 
long as the nature of the reference to other conventions is to create a list of 
illustrative examples of terrorist acts and not to import all the obligations in 
those said conventions.  
A model formulation of the offense according to the above guidelines 
could potentially be: 
Article 8ter: Crime of Terrorism 
1. The Court shall have jurisdiction over acts of terrorism. 
2. For the purpose of this Statute, “terrorism” includes, but is not limited 
to: 
a. An offense according to [specified international counter-terrorism 
conventions] 
b. act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, 
or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a 
situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature 
or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or 
an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.  
B. Terrorism as Part of Existing Crimes 
Certain acts of terrorism might fulfill the requirements of the core crimes 
and thus be within the jurisdiction of the ICC, even if not under the title of 
“terrorist acts.”87 This brings about the matter of treaty interpretation. When 
interpreting an international treaty, such as the Rome Statute, the principal 
guidelines are found in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (the Vienna Convention),88 which are widely considered as 
reflecting customary international law. Article 31 gives preference to the 
treaty’s text, and Article 32 expands the interpreter’s tool kit to include also 
the negotiating history and preparatory work of the treaty (travaux 
préparatories).  
 86. Neil Boister, Treaty Crimes, International Criminal Court?, 12 NEW CRIM. L.
REV. 341, 348 (2009). 
 87. Martinez, supra note 13, at 19. 
 88. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 31 and 32, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
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Whenever the matter of treaty interpretation arises, there will always 
exist a tension between two basic points of view: whether to use the text in 
its literal meaning as understood at the time the treaty was concluded; or to 
look at the purpose the text was attempting to achieve and, thus, pour new 
meanings into it as circumstances change, and realities pose new challenges 
not envisioned at the time of drafting.  
Treaty interpretation in the field of criminal law is to be carried out with 
even greater caution as the consequences for the accused may be 
irreversible.89 The basic principle of criminal law, international and 
domestic, that of Nullum Crimen Sine Lege prohibits punishing a person for 
conduct that was not considered an offense at the time of its commission. 
Thus, beginning to interpret an existing crime to encompass behavior that it 
was not supposed to include, in our case acts of terrorism, is highly 
problematic. Article 22(2) of the Rome Statute addresses this issue and 
explicitly calls for strict interpretation of the offenses and precludes their 
expansion by way of analogy.90 Interpreting the crimes of the Rome Statute 
must also rely on the guidelines set forth in the Elements of Crimes, a 
document elaborating on each element of the offenses designed to assist the 
Court in the interpretation and application of those provisions.91  
The prudent approach does not come without a cost. If we stick to the 
plain language of the offenses in the Rome Statute we may lose some of the 
normative value of prosecuting terrorists as such. Terrorist acts can take 
many forms. What characterizes an act as terrorism and not as “merely” 
criminal is the intention behind it and the political motives it aims to 
achieve. While common criminal acts carry a private purpose, such as 
vendetta or passion, terrorist acts derive from political or ideological 
purposes.92 Prosecuting terrorists as murders,93 even as a crime against 
humanity, may not take this special intent into consideration and, thus, 
could raise serious doubts as to the benefits of such prosecution in the first 
  
 89. In this context see note by the ICTY Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Stanislav 
Gali , Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment and Opinion of Trial Chamber I, ¶ 93 (Dec. 5, 2003), 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4147fb1c4.html. 
 90. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 22(2). For a discussion on how Article 22(2) was 
constructed as a reaction to the “liberal” interpretation endorsed by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Yugoslavia, see SCHABAS, supra note 80, at 93-95. 
 91. Consistent with Article 9 of the Rome Statute. 
 92. Nagle, supra note 37, at 351-52; STL Appeal Chamber decision, supra note 49, 
¶106. It should be noted that the STL Appeal Chamber acknowledged that this element of 
terrorist acts appears inconsistently and differently among states’ legislation and judicial 
decision, and thus this element does not arise to form part of the customary international law 
definition of terrorism.  
 93. Murder is a criminal offence in virtually every criminal legal system. It can also 
be prosecuted in the ICC as a crime against humanity, as set forth in Article 7(1)(a) of the 
Rome Statute. 
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place94 although it could come into play in later stages such as in the 
sentencing.95
What stems from the above discussion is an exclamation mark and a 
question mark that are inseparable from the following offense-specific 
analysis. The exclamation mark stands for the reminder that the language of 
the relevant provision does not tolerate much linguistic and legal juggling. 
Even if the offense as is may encompass the terrorist act, there is a question 
mark as to whether it is also capable of expressing the special intent 
accompanying it. With these in mind we now turn to examine each of the 
current four crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC: genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. Using the three 
case studies presented earlier, the analysis examines to what extent the ICC 
could have provided an alternative recourse to the one that was taken. 
1. Genocide 
Based on the definition in the Genocide Convention,96 Article 6 of the 
Rome Statute defines genocide as one of five possible behaviors when 
committed with a special genocidal intent—“to destroy, in whole or in part, 
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.” Some terrorist acts 
would fill the requirements of at least some of the enumerated acts, such as 
“killing members of the group”97 or “causing serious bodily… to members 
of the group.”98 For instance, in all three case studies people were killed, but 
were they “members of a group?” The Israeli athletes were undoubtedly 
members of a distinct national group. The victims of Pan Am flight 103 and 
9/11 can be said to belong to a much larger group, that of Westerners, or 
arguably American nationals since both incidents were carried out against 
American dominant targets.  
Even if the terrorist act was committed against members of a distinct 
group, it would have a much harder time meeting the specific intent 
requirement.99 The purpose of terrorist acts is rarely the annihilation of the 
victimized group.100 Instead, and as exhibited in the definition of terrorism 
in the Financing Convention, terrorists use the deaths and injuries they 
cause as leverage to achieve another goal, and those deaths and injuries are 
not an end in itself. There may be exceptions, such as in the case of 
Hezbollah, a terrorist organization that had declared that one of its primary 
goals was to destroy the State of Israel, thus arguably qualifying as intent to 
 94. ARNOLD, supra note 13, at 193; Boister, supra note 86, at 356. 
 95. Mazandaran, supra note 13, at 530. 
 96. Genocide Convention, supra note 20.
 97. Rome Statute, supra note 2, Article 6(a). 
 98. Id. art. 6(b).
 99. Martinez, supra note 13, at 25; ARNOLD, supra note 13, at 300. 
 100. ARNOLD, supra note 13, at 300. 
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destroy part of the religious group of Jews or national group of Israelis.101 
Whether their terrorist acts actually amount to destroying “part” of the 
group is a different question.102 
Returning to the three case studies, the stated purpose of the Munich 
massacre was the release of Palestinian prisoners, not the destruction of the 
Israeli people. In the cases of Pan Am flight 103 and 9/11, on the other 
hand, the purpose of the acts was to hurt American interests as part of a 
larger campaign against the West in general and the U.S. in particular. Thus, 
it is possible to argue that, on its face, the perpetrators of both Pan Am flight 
103 and 9/11 possessed genocidal intent.  
There is, however, an uneasy feeling left by this conclusion. This is 
because comparing the historical examples of genocide with both Pan Am 
flight 103 and 9/11, as devastating as those latter events were, is not a 
straightforward equivalence. Even though Article 6 satisfies itself with 
destroying not the entire group but only part of it, it seems that this part 
should be substantial, whether in percentage of the entire group or because 
of the quality of the victims (i.e. all the political, religious or spiritual 
leadership of the group).103 Neither the victims of Pan Am flight 103 nor the 
victims of 9/11 meet this understanding of the term “part.” 
2. Crimes Against Humanity 
Of all the core crimes currently under the jurisdiction of the ICC, crimes 
against humanity require the least legal juggling in order to lend itself to 
terrorism.104 There are many commentators who believe that terrorism could 
be prosecuted under crimes against humanity as currently formulated in 
Article 7 of the Rome Statute and thereby overcome the definitional 
obstacles.105 The strong support for considering terrorism a crime against 
humanity is due to what the definition in Article 7 does not include—a 
requirement that the acts will be committed within the context of war.106 
  
 101. Id. at 301. 
 102. In this regard the STL Appeal Chamber noted that the victims of fear, terror or 
panic “need not necessarily make up the whole population.” STL Appeal Chamber decision, 
supra note 49, ¶ 112. 
 103. This is the approach adopted by the United States Statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 1091 
(2011). See also Prosecutor v. Krsti , Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment of the Appeals 
Chamber, ¶ 8 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/acjug/en/krs-aj040419e.pdf. 
 104. Stephens, supra note 30, at 479. 
 105. Much, supra note 13, at 127; Boister, supra note 86, at 356; Mazandaran, supra 
note 13, at 527; Goldstone & Simpson, supra note 14, at 15; Proulx, supra note 46, at 1012. 
 106. By this, the ICC has followed the path created by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, which for the first time omitted the war nexus that was found in 
definitions of crimes against humanity until that point. See DAVID LUBAN, JULIE R. 
O’SULLIVAN & DAVID P. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
955-61 (2010); ARNOLD, supra note 13, at 273. 
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Thus, the definition of crimes against humanity may encompass terrorist 
acts that are committed during peace times, as is often the case. 
Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute includes several elements in the 
definition of crime against humanity: the commission of any of the acts 
specified in paragraphs (a)-(k); a requirements that the act will be 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack; that the attack 
should be directed against civilian population; and the perpetrator must have 
knowledge of the attack. The following paragraphs will discuss each of 
these four elements. 
First, terrorist acts need to fit into one of the eleven acts enumerated in 
Article 7(1). Those eleven acts are divided into ten specific acts and one 
catch-all phrase in paragraph (k). Of the ten specific acts listed in 
paragraphs (a) through (j), the general notion is that different manifestations 
of terrorism could fit into at least four, those being murder,107 torture,108
persecution,109 and imprisonment and deprivation of liberty.110 In all three 
case studies the perpetrators could have been charged with multiple acts of 
murders. 
Paragraph (k) sets forth that crimes against humanity could also be 
“other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great 
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.” On the 
one hand, terrorist acts, whether they are executed through detonation of 
bombs, taking of hostages, or any other violent manner, are of the same 
nature as those that the Article spells out.111 On the other hand, the history 
and development of crimes against humanity, dating back to the Nuremburg 
Charter, reveals that this crime developed against the background of crimes 
against peace and war crimes. Thus, it can be argued that there is no ground 
to assert that terrorism, a concept well established at that time crimes 
against humanity were recognized, was intended in any way to be included 
under this category.112 The latter approach seems more suitable to the spirit 
of strict interpretation of Article 22(2) as discussed earlier. 
The second element constituting a crime against humanity is that the act 
be committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack. This may prove 
to be a difficult standard to meet in the case of terrorist acts.113 While single 
terrorist acts are usually the expression of a larger radical campaign, the 
 107. Martinez, supra note 13, at 28-32; Mazandaran, supra note 13, at 531; ARNOLD,
supra note 13, at 262. 
 108. Martinez, supra note 13, at 28-32; Mazandaran, supra note 13, at 531; ARNOLD,
supra note 13, at 268. 
 109. Martinez, supra note 13, at 28-32; ARNOLD, supra note 13, at 269. 
 110. Martinez, supra note 13, at 28-32; ARNOLD, supra note 13, at 266. 
 111. Martinez, supra note 13, at 28-32; Mazandaran, supra note 13, at 531; ARNOLD,
supra note 13, at 271.
 112. Bales, supra note 13, at 182. 
 113. Martinez, supra note 13, at 33; Mazandaran, supra note 13, at 533; ARNOLD,
supra note 13, at 263.
244 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 20:2
question arises as to the nature of the required linkage between a single 
attack and that larger plan. More specifically, how much distance between 
the larger plan and the single act can the provision tolerate? Is the general 
campaign of radical Islam against the West sufficient to render every 
isolated terrorist attack carried out by a Muslim “part of a widespread or 
systematic attack?”114 How much time can elapse between two terrorist acts 
but still make them part of a general greater plan?115 In cases where the 
perpetrators of a terrorist attack are not affiliated with a larger terrorist 
organization, or if no such organization have claimed responsibility for the 
attack, this requirements is even harder to satisfy.116
In the case of the Munich massacre, the responsible terrorist 
organization, the “Black September,” indeed carried out other attacks 
against Israeli targets, but it also operated against Jordanian targets and 
attacked the Saudi embassy in Sudan. Do the different agendas of the Black 
September render the Munich massacre not part of a widespread or 
systematic attack? Or is it possible to argue that one terrorist organization 
can carry out several widespread or systematic attacks? The preferable way 
will be to argue in favor of the second option, that attacks of several 
different spheres of interests do not exclude each of them as constituting a 
widespread or systematic attack in itself.  
The Lockerbie incident of Pan Am flight 103 is more difficult to handle. 
The investigation did reveal Libya’s involvement in the attack, but Libya 
did not admit to its part only until a few years had passed. Furthermore, 
while Libya’s name was mentioned as a state sponsor of terrorists, this 
attack seemed to be an isolated attack, and there is no evidence of a 
widespread or systematic attack on behalf of Libya against American 
targets. This is in contrast to the events of 9/11, which were another incident 
in a long chain of terrorist attacks of Al-Qaeda against American targets.117
The third element of Article 7(1) requires the attack to be directed 
against any civilian population. As further explained in Article 7(2)(a), this 
means that the act must be pursuant to some sort of organizational policy, 
not necessarily attributed to a state. This means that terrorist organizations 
with a clear policy to attack civilians will fall within the scope of the 
Article. Terrorist acts are, by the definition adopted above,118 directed 
 114. It should be reminded that in the context of ICC jurisdiction, due to the threshold 
barriers, not every isolated terrorist attack would end up in the ICC, but if such an attack 
would, then the question of the larger campaign would arise.  
115. Compare to the U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence on “pattern of racketeering 
activity” which may, in some circumstances, consist even of two or more acts that were 
committed within the period of ten years. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990); H.J., 
Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989); Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 
785 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Jennings, 842 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1988). 
 116. Mazandaran, supra note 13, at 533. 
 117. Proulx, supra note 46, at 1039, 1068-69. 
 118. See supra § 3.2. 
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towards civilian population.119 Whether or not they are committed in 
furtherance of an organizational policy is a different question, one that 
involves similar problems as the second condition aforementioned, and it 
will be left to be tested on a case-by-case basis. 
In the three examples of this discussion, it is clear that all of them were 
attacks directed against a civilian population. The organizational policy 
requirement is easier to meet in the cases of Black September and Al-
Qaeda; both are terrorist organizations whose stated purposes and repertoire 
of acts clearly illustrate that they target civilians. Whether the Libyan 
government had a policy of committing terrorist acts will be harder to 
prove, and it is also related to the difficulty stemming from the second 
condition discussed above, that the Pan Am flight 103 was an isolated 
event.120 A single incident does not point to the existence of a general 
policy, and more indications of terrorist attacks furthered by Libya will be 
needed to make the case.  
With respect to the fourth element of Article 7, the requirement of 
knowledge that the terrorist act is part of a larger attack means that the 
accused has a sense of the overall context in which he or she is operating.121
This should not pose insurmountable problems if the connection to a 
terrorist organization has already been proven. As distinct from the case of a 
state or government policy, terrorist organizations usually declare publicly 
and take pride in their violent agenda, thus rendering any lack of knowledge 
to a minimum. Both Black September and Al-Qaeda follow this pattern, 
have claimed responsibility for past attacks, and use anti-western sentiments 
in their recruiting mechanisms. Indeed, when the sole purpose of the 
organization is to carry out terrorist attacks, it will be difficult to argue that 
a person did not know his actions are part of the widespread or systematic 
attack. 
The conclusion from the above analysis is that while terrorist acts seem 
to intuitively correlate to the notion of crime against humanity, the actual 
application of the requirements in Article 7 of the Rome Statute to acts of 
terrorism is not a perfect fit. Even the most blunt and clear terrorist attacks, 
such as the Munich massacre, the Pan Am flight 103 bombing, and 9/11, 
will encounter difficulties if prosecuted under Article 7. Much depends 
upon the circumstances of the specific attack and the strength of the 
connection between it and a larger plan by a terrorist organization and other 
terrorist acts that organization has executed.  
 119. Martinez, supra note 13, at 33. 
 120. Isolated, though it could arguably be connected to the Berlin discotheque 
bombing of April 5, 1986, in which a bomb was placed in discotheque frequented by 
members of the United States Armed Forces. Libya was blamed for this incident, and the 
U.S. retaliated with bombing cities in Libya. No individual was ever charged or prosecuted 
as being responsible for this event.  
 121. Proulx, supra note 46, at 1062. 
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Before moving on to examine the next core crime, it should be noted that 
there is a possibility of adding terrorism as a separate act to the list in 
Article 7(1). This will enable the creation of a crime that will include a 
requirement of the special motivation of terrorist acts, thus addressing the 
symbolic matter of prosecuting terrorists. However, it will not solve any of 
the aforementioned difficulties as this offense will still be subject to the 
general requirements of the Article. 
3. War Crimes 
War crimes are unlawful acts committed during an armed conflict.122
They are defined in Article 8 of the Rome Statute, which distinguishes 
between war crimes committed during the course of an international armed 
conflict123 and those committed during an armed conflict not of an 
international character.124 Hence, for terrorist acts to be regarded as war 
crimes, the first requirement is that an armed conflict exists, and then the 
question arises as to the classification of that armed conflict as international 
or non-international. This distinction is of great importance as it determines 
which set of rules will apply and, consequently, whether a certain behavior 
will be considered as a war crime.  
The Rome Statute itself does not provide a definition of what constitutes 
an armed conflict of either type. Thus, the Court has to resort to “the 
applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law, 
including the established principles of the international law of armed 
conflict.”125 This refers to the Geneva Conventions126 and their Additional 
Protocols.127 Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions characterizes an 
international armed conflict as occurring between states.128 This is a 
relatively easy and objective test to be determined,129 although more 
 122. Luban et al., supra note 106, at 1037. 
 123. Rome Statute, supra note 2, Article 8(2)(a)-(b).
 124. Id., art. 8(2)(c)-(f). 
 125. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 205 (Jan. 29, 2007), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc266175.PDF.
 126. Geneva Convention for the Armed Forces, supra note 35; Geneva Convention 
for the Armed Forces at Sea, supra note 35; Geneva Convention for Persons in Time of War, 
supra note 35; Geneva Convention for Prisoners of War, supra note 35. 
 127. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict, Jun. 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. 
 128. Geneva Convention for the Armed Forces, supra note 35, art. 2; Geneva 
Convention for the Armed Forces at Sea, supra note 35, art. 2; Geneva Convention for 
Persons in Time of War, supra note 35, art. 2; Geneva Convention for Prisoners of War,
supra note 35, art. 2.
 129. CURRIE, supra note 64, at 136. 
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controversial examples could arise, such as in the case of the unilateral 
declaration of independence of Kosovo. 
The law of armed conflict addresses non-international armed conflicts in 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as well as in Additional 
Protocol I. Common Article 3 sets forth a minimum standard that should 
apply to non-international armed conflicts. It confines its scope of 
application to any armed conflict involving only one state (or, arguably, no 
state entity) and a limited geographical scope. This wide definition of non-
international armed conflict was narrowed in Additional Protocol II.130
Article 2 of Additional Protocol II excludes from the application of the 
protocol “situation(s) of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, 
isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature.”131
There is no minimum threshold with respect to the length or intensity of the 
conflict. The only condition that is required is that the non-state actor will 
exhibit some form of structure and hierarchy.  
As a matter of practice, it is quite difficult to identify modern armed 
conflicts as belonging to one type or the other. One of the more recent and 
particularly atrocious of armed conflicts, the Balkan war in the early 1990s, 
offers a fitting example of this difficulty. As the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Yugoslavia’s Appeals Chamber in the Tadic case observed— 
In 1993, when the Statute was drafted, the conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia could have been characterized as both internal and 
international, or alternatively, as an internal conflict alongside an 
international one, or as an internal conflict that had become 
internationalized because of external support, or as an international 
conflict that had subsequently been replaced by one or more internal 
conflicts, or some combination thereof.132
This complex issue is worthy of its own extensive examination. The 
following analysis will examine the possibility of terrorist acts be 
considered as war crimes in both scenarios, assuming that the existence of 
an armed conflict has been proved.  
The second tier of the examination is to see if terrorist acts can constitute 
any of the listed war crimes.133 Following the definition in the Financing 
 130. Additional Protocol II, supra note 121, art. 1. 
 131. Id. art. 2. 
 132. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defense Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal of Jurisdiction, ¶ 72 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, 
Oct. 2, 1995), http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?page=search&amp; 
docid=47fdfb520&amp;skip=0&amp;query=IT-94-1-I.
 133. It is worth noting that in contrast to the Rome Statute, the Fourth Geneva 
Convention as well as both Additional Protocols do include a specific prohibition against 
terrorism within their scope. See Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (“No protected 
person may be punished for an offense he or she has not personally committed. Collective 
penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited.”). Article 
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Convention, which highlights that terrorist acts are committed against 
civilian population or against persons not taking direct part in hostilities, the 
answer is affirmative. Each category of crimes includes, as a war crime, the 
intentional targeting and killing or injuring any of these protected persons,134 
in accordance with one of the fundamental principles of the laws of armed 
conflict—the principle of distinction, or noncombatant immunity.135 This is 
also supported by the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Gali  case, which held 
that prohibition against terror is a specific prohibition within the general 
prohibition of attack on civilians.136 
The conclusion of this analysis is that terrorist acts, as defined above, 
may be prosecuted as war crimes, conditioned upon the existence of an 
armed conflict, whether an international or non-international. Some authors 
claim that most terrorist acts are committed in times of peace.137 The STL 
Appeal Chamber also stated that the extent of the customary rule of an 
international crime of terrorism extends only to terrorist acts committed in 
times of peace.138 For instance, there was no non-international armed 
conflict between Israel and Black September139 and no international armed 
conflict between Libya and the United States.  
On the other hand, the vast majority of terrorist bombings in the last 
decade occurred in Iraq during the war. Additionally, the case of 9/11 
illustrates another challenge because Al-Qaeda’s leader, Osama Bin-Laden, 
already declared war on the United States in his infamous fatwa from 1996, 
and the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in 2000 seems to be another example of 
this non-international armed conflict emerging before 9/11. 
Even if 9/11 and other terrorist acts are perceived as part of an armed 
conflict, the prohibition on targeting protected persons in times of hostilities 
  
51(2) of AP1 and Article 13(2) of AP2 use identical language and state that “[t]he civilian 
population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or 
threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian 
population are prohibited.” The Appeal Chamber of the ICTY recognized that these 
provisions reflect customary international law. See Prosecutor v. Gali , Case No. IT-98-29-
A, Appeal Chamber: Judgment, ¶86-88 (Nov. 30, 2006). 
 134. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 8(2)(a)(i), 8(2)(a)(iii), 8(2)(b)(i), 
8(2)(c)(i), 8(2)(e)(i). 
 135. Luban et al., supra note 106, at 1040. 
 136. This was said with respect to Article 51(2) of Additional Protocol I. See Gali  
Trial Chamber I, supra note 89, ¶ 98 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 
2003), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4147fb1c4.html. 
 137. ARNOLD, supra note 13, at 194. 
 138. STL Appeal Chamber decision, supra note 49, ¶ 107. 
 139. However, it is worth noting that in 2006 the Israeli Supreme Court classified the 
conflict between Israel and Hamas as an international armed conflict, even though Hamas 
was not acting on behalf of an independent sovereign state. Thus, one could make a parallel 
argument with regard to Black September, although the circumstances of the two 
organizations are quite different, as Black September targeted sites outside the context of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Hamas is not. See HCJ 769/02 Public Comm. Against Torture 
in Israel v. Gov. of Israel, ¶ 21, (Dec. 13, 2006). 
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is a very well established regime in international humanitarian law, and it is 
hard to think of a case that will not be covered under this protection until 
terrorist acts will also be included within it. Thus, the added value of 
declaring that terrorist acts can be prosecuted as war crimes will not result 
in prosecuting cases that until now were left unaddressed.  
4. The Crime of Aggression 
The Review Conference held in the summer of 2010 adopted a definition 
of the crime of aggression,140 which will be in force with respect to the 
States Parties that have ratified it in accordance with the amendment 
procedure described above.141 The new Article 8bis defines the crime of 
aggression as “the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person 
in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or 
military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, 
gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the 
United Nations.”142
This definition consists of several key elements of crucial importance to 
the consideration of terrorist acts as crimes of aggression.143 First, the act of 
aggression is defined as an act of a state.144 Thus, a first step is to determine 
that a state committed an act of aggression, and only then would certain 
individuals be liable for the crime of aggression.145 This observation stands 
at the heart of many controversies as to what body will determine the 
existence of an act of aggression on the part of a state, one choice being the 
Security Council the other is the ICC itself; and what will be the nature of 
the relationship between this external political decision, or lack thereof, on 
the actions of the Prosecutor.146
The reference to acts of states excludes individual members of non-state 
terrorist organizations from the scope of jurisdiction and, thus, effectively 
leaves out the majority of terrorist acts.147 In this respect it is worth 
mentioning that the Security Council has regarded a non-state actor as an 
aggressor at least in one case in the late 1970s.148 In addition, few 
 140. Review Conference, supra note 43, at 18. 
 141. See Part 4, supra.
 142. Review Conference, supra note 43, at 18.
 143. For a historical survey of the development of the legal definition of criminal 
aggression and its main elements, see Petty, supra note 38; Benjamin B. Ferencz, Enabling 
the International Criminal Court to Punish Aggression, 6 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 551 
(2007).
 144. Review Conference, supra note 43, at 21. 
 145. Judith Lichtenberg, The Crime of Aggression and the International Criminal 
Court, 13 TILBURG FOREIGN L. REV. 160, 165 (2006). 
 146. For further elaboration on this point, see id.
 147. Martinez, supra note 13, at 50. 
 148. S.C. Res. 405, U.N. Doc. S/RES/405 (Apr. 14, 1977) (involving aggression 
against Benin). 
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commentators regarded acts of aggression as acts that can be carried out by 
states or “similar entities.”149 However, these sources cannot by themselves 
indicate any change or a nascent perception of the ability of non-state actors 
to carry out acts of aggression and, thus, the ability of their members to be 
liable for the crime of aggression. 
Out of the three case studies examined in this paper, the Munich 
massacre and 9/11 cannot be considered as acts of aggression because they 
were not perpetrated by a state. Within the relatively narrow spectrum of 
terrorist acts committed by agents of a state against another state, it can be 
argued that acts such as the Lockerbie case meet the definition of 
aggression. By exploding a bomb over British soil, Libya arguably 
committed an act of aggression against the United Kingdom, and by 
exploding an American courier it can similarly be argued that it committed 
an act of aggression against the United States. Thus, both the United 
Kingdom and the United States could have viewed Libya’s leaders’ 
furtherance of the Pan Am flight 103 bombing as a crime of aggression.  
C. Including the Crime of Terrorism in the Rome Statute: A      
Summation 
The above analysis demonstrates the problems involved with trying to fit 
terrorist acts into existing molds of the current core crimes. Each one of the 
four crimes described was designed to deal with certain circumstances, and 
terrorist acts do not always manifest themselves in such a manner. The 
crime of genocide poses a difficult challenge with respect to the special 
intention it requires, as terrorists usually seek to change the status quo rather 
than to annihilate a protected group. Crimes against humanity are arguably 
the most suitable format to prosecute terrorist acts although they also 
require a wider context of a wide spread or systematic attack and, thus, raise 
the threshold for the more common isolated terrorist acts. While these may 
meet the gravity threshold in and of themselves, the lack of a broader 
campaign prevents them from being tried as crimes against humanity. War 
crimes are conditioned upon the existence of an armed conflict and, thus, 
will not encompass terrorist acts committed in times of peace; the newly 
introduced crime of aggression excludes terrorist acts committed by non-
state actors, thus casting serious doubts as to its relevancy to most acts of 
terrorism. Taken together, it appears that prosecution of terrorist acts will be 
more likely to succeed under a separate individual crime of terrorism with 
due regard to the challenges this avenue poses.  
 149. Ferencz, supra note 143, at 562.
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V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The previous section presented the various options to incorporate 
terrorism into the Rome Statute, either explicitly or through interpretation of 
existing crimes. Like most things in the realm of international relations and 
international law, where there is a will there is a way. If states will fully 
commit to using the ICC as means to suppress terrorist acts, they will adopt 
any of the abovementioned legal platforms to do so. The problem then 
comes to generating the will. This part will explore the pros and cons of 
including terrorism under the auspices of the ICC. Prosecuting terrorists in 
the ICC offers prominent advantages, and encompasses various issues, from 
the rights of the accused to the normative message it represents. However, 
there are practical downsides that should not be underestimated. 
A. Advantages of ICC Jurisdiction over Terrorism  
The ICC’s advantages in terms of legal procedure are fairly clear.150
Compared to some national legal systems, some of which are ineffective or 
are perceived as ineffective, the ICC provides a more capable forum.151 The 
ICC provides the highest standards of due process and secures the rights of 
the accused to an extent that terrorist suspects will probably not enjoy 
elsewhere.152 The ICC also allows a great deal of victims’ participation in 
the proceedings, a concept that is foreign at least in common law systems 
and may generate wide public support for prosecuting terrorists in the ICC 
as opposed to national forums.153
From the point of view of States Parties, the ICC offers a neutral and 
impartial forum and will enable them to discard any judicial and political 
impasses that they would have encountered had they pursued the 
prosecution in national courts.154 From the other side of the coin, the ICC 
provides a solution to a situation where a terrorist attack affects several 
States Parties which hold competing claims of jurisdiction.155
While important and viable, this argument is also slightly naïve as 
illustrated by Vincent-Joel Proulx, who argued that if the ICC had been in 
 150. For more thorough review of the procedural aspects of the ICC, see M. CHERIF 
BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 522-23 (2003). 
 151. Neil Boister, supra note 86, at 341. 
 152. Bales, supra note 13, at 189; Kathleen Maloney-Dunn, Humanizing Terrorism 
Through International Criminal Law: Equal Justice for Victims, Fair Treatment of Suspects, 
and Fundamental Human Rights at the ICC, 8 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 69, 74 (2010); 
Mazandaran, supra note 13, at 540; Goldstone & Simpson, supra note 14, at 23. 
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discussed at length in SCHABAS, supra note 80, at 171-75. 
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place during the Lockerbie incidents, Gaddafi would have surrendered the 
Libyan nationals to the ICC.156 While states may be suspicious of other 
states’ judicial systems trying their own nationals, the notion that Gaddafi 
and other leaders of his sort would have trusted the ICC is, at best, 
farfetched. We are now experiencing the living proof of this point as the 
recent events in Libya and the international intervention against Gaddafi 
included a statement by the Prosecutor that he will start an investigation of 
the situation in Libya beginning February 15, 2011.157 The prospects of 
Gaddafi surrendering to the ICC are not promising. It is more plausible that 
the ICC will come into play between several like-minded countries with a 
common interest in ICC prosecution than by third world leaders on their 
own initiative surrendering their nationals to the ICC. 
Examining ICC jurisdiction over terrorism from a counter-terrorism 
standpoint also reveals several benefits. The scope of the ICC jurisdiction 
will cover members of terrorist groups that hold powerful positions within a 
country’s formal institutions, whether political parties or others.158 This is 
particularly important since in these cases the prospects of national 
prosecutions are virtually null.159
Another important feature that makes the ICC attractive as a counter-
terrorism measure is found in Article 25 of the Rome Statute. According to 
this Article, the ICC can exercise jurisdiction not only over the main 
perpetrator of the offense but also over a wide variety of his accomplices. 
What makes this provision especially important in the terrorism context is 
the fact that many terrorist acts are committed through some sort of suicide 
attacks.160 In these cases the perpetrator himself obviously cannot stand trial, 
but the people who aided and abetted him, incited him, or otherwise 
facilitated the act could.  
Furthermore, ICC jurisdiction over terrorism might strengthen domestic 
enforcement of counter-terrorism measures.161 Evidently, in the relatively 
short period since its establishment, the ICC had the effect of facilitating 
and strengthening domestic initiatives to outlaw the crimes that were under 
its jurisdiction.162 This is arguably due to the aforementioned 
complementarity principle. If states were reluctant to find themselves in The 
Hague with respect to the other core crimes, so as to render their domestic 
 156. Proulx, supra note 46, at 1015-17. 
 157. Press Release, ICC Prosecutor to Open an Investigation in Libya (Mar. 2, 2011), 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/
statement%20020311.
 158. This assumes that that the country would be a State Party to the ICC, which at the 
current state of events, rules out many key players in the international arena, unless the 
Security Council would refer a case to the ICC.
 159. Bales, supra note 13, at 189; Proulx, supra note 46, at 1018. 
 160. Martinez, supra note 13, at 17. 
 161. Stephens, supra note 30, at 479. 
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enforcement efforts more effective, the same process could be anticipated 
with respect to terrorism. Not only that, the ICC will set the standard 
regarding prosecution of terrorists and will thus generate cohesiveness and 
legal predictability.163
In this regard, Professor Nagle argued that the lack of cooperation among 
states to extradite terrorist suspects is an obstacle to seeing terrorism as an 
international crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC.164 The point made 
here is exactly the opposite. While states may act suspiciously in a bilateral 
basis, on a multilateral basis, like the ICC, the safeguards against abusing 
rights are higher, and the expectations for cooperation are higher as well. 
Thus, while a state “can get away” with stalling or refusing extradition of 
terrorist suspects to another state, it can be argued that it will not have the 
same leeway to do it before the ICC. In order to avoid being portrayed as 
“unwilling” or “unable,” it is expected that ICC jurisdiction over terrorism 
will increase bilateral cooperation, rather than reflect any lack thereof.  
Finally, on a more normative level, ICC jurisdiction will send a clear 
signal that the international community condemns terrorism in the utmost 
way. ICC jurisdiction will enhance the universal condemnation of terrorist 
acts and will strengthen the rejection of terrorism as a means to bring 
political change.165 As Goldstone and Simpson correctly noted, “the 
important link between peace and prosecution by an impartial court should 
not be underestimated.”166 From a general human rights perspective, ICC 
jurisdiction over acts of terrorism would arguably present an alternative to 
combating terrorism through the use of forceful measures.167
According to this argument, prosecuting Al-Qaeda members in the ICC 
could have been an alternative to United States engagement in Afghanistan 
following 9/11. It would have likewise allowed the Israeli government 
another course of action before resorting to a covert, global manhunt for the 
members of Black September. On the other hand, since the ICC does not 
have its own police force and is dependent on cooperation from Member 
States in surrendering suspects, it could equally be argued that an ICC arrest 
warrant would have still required United States involvement in Afghanistan 
and Israeli covert actions to apprehend the perpetrators, even if only to 
eventually transfer them to The Hague.  
B. Disadvantages of ICC Jurisdiction over Terrorism 
The abovementioned values of prosecuting terrorists in the ICC carry a 
lot of weight. However, they are being overshadowed by practical 
 163. Goldstone & Simpson, supra note 14, at 22. 
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disadvantages. As will be elaborated ahead, the downsides of including 
terrorism within ICC jurisdiction are mostly practical ones and derive their 
strength from the realpolitik of the work of the ICC and cooperation among 
states when it comes to terrorism. 
First and foremost among those is, as mentioned before, the fact that the 
ICC does not have its own police force and is dependent on the good will 
and cooperation of States Parties in every step of the way,168 from sharing 
intelligence, through the collection of evidence, to the apprehension of the 
suspect.169 At the end of the day, if the ICC will not be able to get terrorists 
to stand trial, then why go through all the trouble of a politically sensitive 
problem of generating jurisdiction over terrorism? Instead, it might prove 
more useful to put more effort into strengthening domestic legal systems in 
their fight against terrorism with a tailor made strategy for each country.170
Another practical problem is that the United States is currently not a 
member of the ICC.171 With the United States running its own worldwide 
campaign against terrorists, introducing ICC jurisdiction over terrorist acts 
might create two competing routes. Thus, third states might face a dilemma 
with which of the two to cooperate. Suppose a state party to the Rome 
Statute has apprehended a terrorist suspect that an arrest warrant was issued 
against but is also wanted by the United States; to whom should that state 
surrender the suspect? Which obligation comes first—an obligation to 
cooperate with the ICC or an obligation to respond to an extradition request 
by the United States?172
From the ICC’s own perspective, including terrorism under its 
jurisdiction might not be self-serving. The ICC is a relatively young 
institution that is still developing and proving its credibility and legitimacy. 
It is struggling with claims against it being a court for “African States”173
and with the embarrassing reality of its limited powers, as shown by the 
non-enforced arrest warrant against Al-Bashir. In this context, bringing an 
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internationally sensitive and controversial matter such as terrorism into the 
Court’s jurisdiction might not contribute to strengthening the Court’s 
reputation and status.  
Additionally, prosecuting terrorists in the ICC, as mentioned previously, 
is likely to generate more national prosecutions of terrorists. This may seem 
as a shortcoming rather than an advantage because, as Professor Naomi 
Norberg argues, “unlike genocide or crimes against humanity, for example, 
terrorism is the subject of ongoing police operations and measures that at 
times violate the very human rights the ICC at least indirectly protects.”174
She claims that in the name of following ICC’s directions, national law 
enforcement authorities will enjoy a greater shield to violate human rights 
of suspects and detainees.175 This is indeed a concern, but it is not as 
threatening as Norberg asserts. Mistreating suspects and detainees could be 
regarded as a state “unwillingness” or “inability” to exercise a just criminal 
trial and thus generate ICC jurisdiction. Within the ICC itself, as mentioned 
earlier, the rights of the suspects are vigorously maintained, and arguments 
as to compromising those rights could cost the prosecution its case.  
Finally, from a deterrence point of view, some optimistic views see the 
international criminal adjudication as the most effective deterrent for future 
terrorism.176 This view is questionable at best.177 Terrorist organizations do 
not hold any respect for the rule of law or they would not choose to work 
outside the law and target innocent civilians in the first place. They motivate 
their people by talking in terms of ideology, religion, martyrs, and the 
like.178 If a person is willing to wear explosives on his body and bomb 
himself it is doubtful that his thoughts wander to The Hague before he 
pushes the button. A criminal trial will probably not deter the perpetrators or 
the men who send them, and addressing terrorist acts only ex post facto
makes it seem less attractive than alternative avenues of international law, 
such as the laws of armed conflict, which have a more substantial deterrence 
effect.179
CONCLUSIONS
Since the end of World War II major institutional developments have 
happened in international criminal law, the most prominent of those being 
the establishment of a permanent international criminal court. This 
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institution has been operating for almost a decade, and it embodies the 
aspiration of its member states to end impunity for the perpetrators of the 
most heinous of crimes. Though still in its infancy, the ICC is gaining 
legitimacy and credibility and induces enforcement of international criminal 
law within national boundaries. 
Parallel to this development, the last decades have also witnessed a sharp 
escalation in international terrorist acts, both in numbers and the magnitude 
of the harm they generate. Terrorist groups, whether operating 
independently or under the auspices of a state, target civilian populations 
with the hopes that their acts will influence a decision making process. 
Whether they explode a bomb on a bus in Jerusalem, on trains in Madrid, in 
the streets of New Delhi or fly commercial airplanes into the World Trade 
Center in New York, terrorists groups have been largely successful in 
getting away with it. Furthermore, states that experienced terrorist attacks 
on their soil adopt measures in order to better face the new threat, measures 
that carry great costs. 
The question that arises is why these two parallel developments do not 
collide? More precisely, why is the ICC not being used in the international 
effort to suppress terrorism? This paper suggested that including terrorist 
acts as an international crime in the Rome Statute is more a question of 
policy considerations and realpolitik constraints than it is a question of law. 
To support this claim, it has been illustrated how the core legal questions 
arising from the inclusion of terrorism in the Rome Statute can be answered. 
First and foremost, Part 2 looked at the historical reasons for rejecting 
the inclusion of terrorism within the ICC jurisdiction as presented at the 
Rome Conference. It concluded that out of the six primary concerns that 
prevented the adoption of terrorism as an international crime, only the 
definitional issue may still be valid today. However, as seen, even the 
definition of terrorist acts, the one issue that has been constantly regarded as 
insolvable, is illuminated in a different light as the STL Appeal Chambers 
decision acknowledged the existence of a definition of terrorism under 
customary international law. While legal scholars were busy hiding behind 
idioms like “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter,” states’ 
legislation and practice created a common sense definition of what terrorism 
is.
This customary definition correlates to the most widely accepted 
international definition of terrorism, which is found in Article 2 of the 
Financing Convention, as elaborated in Part 3. The prospects of adopting a 
Comprehensive Convention by the UN do not seem to be coming true in the 
near future, leaving the Financing Convention the most comprehensive and 
recognized reference for defining terrorism. This definition is both practical 
and appropriate. Its language allows its application to contemporary threats, 
such as terrorism by non-state actors (in addition to state terrorism) and 
cyber-terrorism. It was recognized by a vast majority of states and was 
included in Security Council Resolution 1373, calling for its immediate 
2012] Prosecuting Terrorists at the International Criminal Court 257
integration to national legislation. Thus, even the most controversial issue of 
defining terrorism proves to be not insurmountable. 
As to the ICC itself, the procedure to amend the Rome Statute is 
straightforward and can be utilized at any given time. As demonstrated in 
Part 4, in order to trigger this procedure and ensure it is a successful one, 
diplomatic lobbying for promoting the idea of a crime of terrorism will be 
needed behind the scenes, getting the support of States Parties prior to 
making the official proposal for amendment. This is tied to the conclusion 
in Part 5, which surveyed the four crimes currently within the jurisdiction of 
the ICC and concluded that while they may lend themselves to terrorist acts 
in some cases, it is subject to legal interpretation, and persuasive arguments 
can be made either way. Prosecutions of major terrorists ought not to be 
based upon such vagueness, and a crime of terrorism needs to be articulated 
by itself and to stand alone as an independent crime.  
Amending the Rome Statute so as to include an independent crime of 
terrorism requires, as previously noted, a great deal of political and 
diplomatic efforts to make such an amendment possible. These political and 
diplomatic efforts will be influenced by a set of pros and cons, such as the 
ones discussed in Part 6. The advantages of the ICC are mainly of 
normative value, such as maintaining due process rights for the accused as 
well as for the victims; allowing a neutral and impartial forum in cases of 
conflicting jurisdiction claims between several states; and reinforcing the 
international community’s denunciation of terrorist acts. The shortcomings 
of the ICC are more practical in nature. Most notably of those shortcomings 
are the absence of U.S. membership in the institution, the lack of 
independent enforcement capabilities of the ICC, and its dependence on the 
cooperation of State Parties, notwithstanding the fact that they committed 
themselves to cooperate when they joined the institution.  
International criminal law can be a powerful instrument. It generated the 
conviction of perpetrators of the most devastating atrocities such as World 
War II and the Holocaust, the Rwandan Genocide, the Srebrenica Genocide, 
and more. This powerful instrument should also be employed to combat 
terrorism. It is easy to put on a serious face and blame the lawyers and the 
legal complexities, but the fact of the matter is that the law is not an 
impediment in treating terrorist acts as the grave international crimes they 
are. The reason the two parallel routes of the establishment of the ICC and 
the advancement of international terrorism have not yet collided is politics, 
not law. As a matter of law, the road is open for including terrorism as a 
crime in the Rome Statute and by this to add another tier to the international 
fight against terrorism. 

